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Abstract
In order to decrease the consumer return transaction cost, e-commerce platform Alibaba
invited an insurance company to develop a new type of insurance to compensate consumers
for returns, which is called return-freight insurance. The new insurance has resulted in
online return's explosive growth. However, some online retailers still choose to offer
complimentary return-freight insurance to signal their products' quality. Using signaling
theory, we build a conceptual economic model to explore what kind of online retailer should
adopt this strategy under incomplete information. Based on the fact that each product's
return probability, profit, and insurance compensation are different, our main results show
the separating equilibria, where only high-quality online retailers will offer complimentary
return-freight insurance. Interestingly, return-freight insurance profit and compensation
play different roles in the signal effect. The insurance premium plays a deep role while the
compensation plays at the surface, because consumers could only observe the compensation
when purchasing.
Keywords Return-freight insurance, Signaling Quality, Separating Equilibrium
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1 Introduction
With continuing e-commerce development, the number and types of online products are constantly
increasing, giving consumers more choices. Such online environments are the norm for experience
goods. But even for so-called search goods, because people are increasingly buying products online,
there is significant uncertainty about product quality at the time of purchase. It is not strange that the
return rates for online shopping are generally double those of brick-and-mortar purchases
(McWilliams 2012). Initially, some online retailers and platforms provided money-back guarantees
(MBGs) as a return policy, which can be used as a product-quality signal (Moorthy and Srinivasan
1995). However, since all major online retailers improved their product quality and take the MBG
strategy, it is no longer an effective signal (McWilliams 2012). Though online reputation, product
descriptions, and online product reviews could serve as product-quality signals (Mavlanova et al.
2012), they can easily be subverted by fake online reviews or opinion spam (Lau et al. 2011), confusing
consumers (Dellarocas 2003). This situation requires more shopping skills of online consumers and
the aforementioned signals do not work well. Are any other effective signal available to online
retailers?
In 2010, an insurance company, which profits by using the probability of product reservation, invented
a new type insurance called return-freight insurance (Zhang and Hu 2013). Regardless of whether the
purchase is insured by the consumer or by the online retailer, insurance company will pay the returnfreight fee if the consumer returns a product after the purchase. With a low premium, easy signup, and
convenient claim features, return-freight insurance provides psychological and financial security for
online consumers. However, the emergence of return-freight insurance leads to another problem:
many more returns than before, which has exhausted online retailers (Shulman et al. 2010; Zhang and
Hu 2013). Return quantity increased significantly, partially because some online retailers offer the
return-freight insurance for free to consumers. Does this choice provide information to consumers that
these retailers' products are high quality? We call the aforementioned strategy complimentary returnfreight insurance. High-quality retailers consider absorbing the consumer’s return transaction cost to
signal that their product quality is high. In contrast, the usual return policy (MBG) allows the
consumer to return a product for any reason, but requires the consumer to bear the return-freight fee.
Since most online retailers adopt the MBG strategy (Hsiao and Chen 2012), our objective is to show
whether the more lenient return policy, complimentary return-freight insurance, can signal onlineproduct quality. A low-quality online retailer offering a complimentary return-freight will have a
higher probability of return than a high-quality retailer. With homogeneous consumers, this effect by
itself is sufficient to ensure a low-quality retailer does not mimic the high-quality retailer’s
complimentary return-freight insurance strategy. We interpret this logic by building a conceptual
economic model and analysing the costs and benefits of using complimentary return-freight insurance
as a signal.
The high-quality online retailer, who knows that his product is better than his competitors', is eager to
signal that quality to consumers. The consumer, a signal receiver who does not know which online
retailer's product is better, may see the high-quality retailer’s largesse as signaling a high-quality
product. However, when the return-freight insurance is purchased directly by the consumer, he or she
observes both the insurance premium and the compensation. In contrast, when offered by the online
retailer, only the insurance compensation is available to the consumer. Products of different quality
levels have different insurance premiums and compensation (Geng et al. 2017), so the retailer must
decide whether to offer complimentary return-freight insurance as a product-quality signal, and what
level of compensation signals best. On the other hand, the consumer observes two meanings from the
return-freight insurance. First, the consumer sees whether the retailer give the insurance as a gift.
After that, without knowing the premium, the consumer can only calculate the insurance
compensation. Whether a higher or a lower compensation signals more effectively is the focus of our
research.
We interpret the important conception of online product quality broadly to mean performance on
attributes, which are quickly revealed after purchase and received without consuming the product
followed the assumption in Moorthy and Srinivasan's work (Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995), including
such attributes as whether the product is suitable to the consumer’s needs, fit, and style, etc. These
attributes that could have been considered before purchase, but could not be revealed because either
the online purchase is a remote transaction or the product delivered is hidden in packaging. The online
retailer is trying to signal the correspondence between what is claimed about these attributes in the
online description and what will be delivered. The meaning of quality is related the issue that online
purchases are returned for many reasons in addition to simple product defects (Dellarocas 2003).
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Our article is related to a long-standing literature on return policies and signaling. As the product
returns serve as an instrument to protect consumers against product-quality uncertainty. Our article is
also related to the large literature on product warranties. In the classic paper, Moorthy and
Srinivasan's signaling model represents the comparative analysis of MBG use between high- and lowquality sellers, demonstrating that it is relatively more costly for the retailers whose product quality is
low (Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995). This provides an effective tool for high-quality sellers to
distinguish themselves from others. However, McWilliams indicates that MBGs are ubiquitous among
major retailers, explores a competitive environment between high- and low- quality retailers, and finds
low-quality retailer gains relative to when MBGs were not offered (McWilliams 2012), which appears
to be aimed at denying Moorthy and Srinivasan's signaling model, and also means a new productquality signal is needed in practice. Moorthy and Srinivasan also discuss that sellers should absorb the
buyer's transaction cost when the cost is small enough (Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995). In contrast, our
results reveal that, even when the quality signal (the return-freight insurance premium) is not cheap, it
can still be worthwhile for high-quality retailers to occupy the market. There are also papers that
demonstrate the insurance effect (Grossman 1981; Gu and Tayi 2015; HEAL 1985). The central idea is
that a more lenient return policy boosts consumer demand and increases the retailers' gross revenue.
In the real world, the return-freight insurance premium and compensation is not fixed as they imaged,
but flexible (Zhang and Hu 2013). A key insight of our study is that, in the online shopping context
with real insurance instead of the insurance effect, the high-quality retailer's revenue does not always
increase.
A return is actually a good opportunity to please the customer and a recognized tool to create more
loyal consumers (Griffis et al. 2012; Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro 2005). This is even truer for the
increasingly popular Internet sales in where examining the product physically before purchasing is
impossible. The return policy is still essential even in the context of the financial crisis and a loose
return policy was more profitable than tight return policy (Petersen and Kumar 2010). The purchase
decision is likely to be framed as two separate decisions: consumers' decisions to order and, upon
receipt, their decisions to keep or return the item. The endowment effect suggests some surprising
benefits of return policy leniency to the retailer (Wood 2001). From the manufacturer’s point of view,
following a policy of modularization and offering a generous return policy would increase revenue, but
also increase the cost due to increased likelihood of return and increased design costs (Mukhopadhyay
and Setoputro 2005).
Using signaling theory, Mavlanova et al. found that low-quality retailers were likely to avoid costly and
easy-to-verify signals and used fewer signals than did high-quality retailers, who used costly and
difficult-to-verify signals and displayed more signals (Mavlanova et al. 2012). Using a signaling model,
conditions were obtained when online retailers use price to manage their customers’ service
expectations. In contrast to extant theory, it is possible for both low- and high-service online retailers
to use price to signal their service levels (Mitra and Fay 2010). Lee et al. (2005) investigate three
possible signals to distinguish “trustworthy” and “untrustworthy” Web merchants in the case of B2C
Internet commerce. A firm may signal the unobservable quality of its products through several
marketing-mix variables. Kirmani et al. developed a typology that classifies signals and discussed the
available empirical evidence on the signaling properties of several marketing variables (Kirmani and
Rao 2000). To our knowledge, using a return policy as a signal has not been studied in e-commerce,
only in offline commerce. The e-commerce product return is more complicated. In the real world, the
consumer's cost for returning to the store will not bother the retailer much, while the product
transaction fee always affects both sides of an e-commerce transaction. We examine whether the new
return policy still fits the same separating equilibrium condition as for offline retailers.

2 Model
Due to length limitations, we only consider an online retailer selling a product to a homogeneous
group of online consumers. Without loss of generality, the size of the group is normalized to 1. We
follow Moorthy and Srinivasan's assumption (Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995) with the addition of
return-freight insurance. The online retailer could offer a high-quality product or a low-quality
product. We call the retailer offering a high-quality product a type h retailer, while a retailer offering a
low-quality product a type l retailer. The unit costs are ch and cl for the two type of retailers with

ch > cl = 0 .
For this paper, we assume that online consumers cannot know the product quality before purchasing.
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Consumers have a perceived utility, vh , for the high-quality product if it “works”; otherwise the
reservation price is 0 . The corresponding numbers for the low-quality product are vl and 0 ,
respectively. The probability of a high-quality product not working is fh and the probability of a lowquality product not working is fl . We assume that 0 < fh < fl < 1 and (1 − fh )vh > (1 − fl )vl . Our notion
of quality is consistent with that in the total quality management (TQM) literature (Moorthy and
Srinivasan 1995). This literature defines quality as comprising both “levels of attributes” and
“consistency in delivery of attributes.” In our model, level of attributes is contained in the consumer’s
perceived utility for a working product ( vh and vl for high and low qualities, respectively), while
consistency in delivery is contained in the probability of working ( 1 − fh and 1 − fl ).
The pricing strategy of return-freight insurance contains two parts: the premium, T , and the
compensation, C , (Geng et al. 2017). As with other types of insurance, a different estimation the risk
implies a different insurance premium (Barseghyan et al. 2013). Return-freight insurance is focused
on the risk of product return. The return-freight insurance premiums for high- and low-quality
products are Th and Tl , respectively, which also have two parts: marginal cost and profit. Different
from traditional cargo insurance, return-freight insurance does not compensate product damage
during delivery, but focuses on the product-return freight fee. The return-freight insurance
compensation for high- and low-quality products are C h and C l , respectively. Let T j = f j C j + π j ,

π j > 0 , j = h,l , the difference between the high and low return-freight insurance premium profits is
e1 = π h − π l , and the difference between high and low return-freight insurance compensation is
e2 = Ch − Cl . Therefore, π j > 0 means that regardless of whether product quality is high or low, the
insurance company makes profit from the expected insurance premium. Return-freight insurance has
two endogenous constraints: The insurance premium must be less than the compensation ( T j < C j );
otherwise, nobody would insure when purchasing. The second is that the insurance compensation
must be less than or equal the return-freight fee ( C j ≤ tb ), to address the insurance moral hazard.
Our modeling of consumer utility via reservation prices subsumes within it the assumption that
consumers are risk-neutral in evaluating gambles and product price is higher than transaction cost (
p > tb ). This allows us to ensure that, when the product does not work, consumers would return it.
The online retailer has to make two decisions: Choose a price, p , for the product and decide whether
to offer consumers complimentary return-freight insurance. If complimentary return-freight insurance
is not offered, product return will work as follows. The consumer may return the product if he or she
wishes and get p back. However, the consumer will have to bear the transaction cost (such as the
return-freight fee), tb , of sending the product back. In contrast, if complimentary insurance is offered,
the consumer may return the product to receive p and suffer little or even no transaction cost: tb − C ,
due to the compensation from the insurance company. The difference of the two strategies for the
online retailer is whether it pays an insurance premium T when the consumer purchases.
Under both return strategies, online retailers have to deal with the transaction cost and the product
salvage value. Therefore, we assume that both the online retailer’s transaction cost of processing a
return and the product’s salvage value are 0 for the convenience of calculating.
The entire notation used in the paper is summarized in Table 1 for reference.
Description
Symbol
vj

Consumers’ perceived utility for type j online product when it works, j = h,l

fj

Probability of type j online retailer’s product not working, j = h,l

cj

Type j retailer’s marginal cost of production, j = h,l

tb

Consumer’s transaction cost for regular product return

p jc ( p jn )

Optimal complete-information product price for type j online retailer with (without)
a complimentary return-freight insurance, j = h,l
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Π cj ( Π nj )

Type j online retailer’s expect profit with (without) a complimentary return-freight

r jc ( r jn )

Reservation price for type j online retailer’s product with (without) complimentary

Tj

The return-freight insurance premium for type j online retailer, j = h,l

Cj

The return-freight insurance compensation for type j online retailer, j = h,l

πj

Insurance company’s profit for type j product, j = h,l

e1 ( e2 )

Difference between high and low return-freight insurance profit and compensation

insurance when quality is known, j = h,l
return-freight insurance, j = h,l

Table 1. Notation

3 Complimentary Return-freight insurance as a signal of product
quality: homogeneous consumers
In this section, we assume the consumer does not know the online product quality a priori. Can the
high-quality online retailer signal product quality by offering complimentary return-freight insurance?
The standard methodology for addressing this question is to model the online retailer–consumer
interaction as a sequential game of incomplete information and look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
satisfying the intuitive criterion: The online retailer moves first with a complimentary return-freight
insurance or MBG without return-freight insurance. The consumer moves second with a decision to
purchase or not purchase the product. The consumer’s decision will be based on her posterior
assessment of the probability of dealing with as high-quality online retailer after observing the online
retailer’s offer because that determines his or her reservation price for the online product. If and only if
the online product’s price does not exceed the reservation price, the consumer will buy it. The intuitive
criterion is designed to reduce the number of perfect Bayesian equilibria by restricting consumers’
beliefs off the equilibrium path. Essentially, it says that if the consumer observes an out-ofequilibrium-price complimentary return-freight insurance offer that is dominated by the equilibrium
offer for one type of online retailer and not the other, then the consumer should assume that the latter
made the offer.
We define a separating equilibrium as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion
in which the two types of online retailer employ different strategies. In such an equilibrium, the online
retailer’s type is revealed by the chosen strategy. Given our objective of discovering whether a
complimentary return-freight insurance could be used to signal quality, we will be looking for a
separating equilibrium in which only the high-quality online retailer offers complimentary returnfreight insurance. The other possibility is an equilibrium where the two types of online retailer use the
same strategy. This is a pooling equilibrium, which offers no signaling opportunity.
To view the role of complimentary return-freight insurance, let us compute the consumer’s reservation
price for the two types of products when complimentary return-freight insurance is not offered and the
product is returned normally upon failure. Figure 1(a) shows the “gamble” faced by the consumer
when the online retailer’s price is p . When the product does not work, the consumer has to decide
between returning the product and not returning. In the former case, the consumer’s surplus is −tb :
the product provides no utility, the consumer gets p back, and the transaction cost of redeeming the
return is tb . In the latter case, the consumer surplus is − p . The consumer will return the nonfunctional product if and only if tb < p . Given the probability of a non-functional product, if it is
returned, the consumer surpluses are (1 − fh )(vh − p) − fhtb and (1 − fl )(vl − p) − fl tb for the high- and
low-quality products, respectively. Therefore, the reservation prices in the cases of product returns are

rhn = vh −

fh
f
tb (1) rln = vl − l tb (2)
1 − fh
1 − fl
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These reservation prices are meaningful only when they exceed tb , which translates to tb < rh and
tb < rl .
With a price p , the expected profit for the two types of online retailer are ( p − ch ) − fh p and p − fl p ,
respectively. Substituting for p the corresponding reservation price, we get the online retailer’s
maximum expected profit under MBG:
Πnh = (1 − fh )vh − ch − fhtb (3) Πln = (1 − fl )vl − fl tb (4)

(a)

(b)

Figure 1(a): MBG without complimentary return-freight insurance
Figure 1(b): Return with complimentary return-freight insurance
If the online retailer offers complimentary return-freight insurance and the product price is p , then
the consumer’s decision problem is shown in Figure 1(b). When the product does not work, the
consumer's returning condition is changed: The transaction cost is compensated by the insurance
company with a compensation C . The consumer surplus is (1 − fh )(vh − p) − fh (tb − Ch ) and

(1 − fl )(vl − p) − fl (tb − Cl ), for the high- and low-quality products, respectively. The reservation prices
in the presence of complimentary return-freight insurance are:

rhC = vh −

f
fh
(tb − Ch ) (5) rlC = vl − l (tb − Cl ) (6)
1 − fl
1 − fh

Now, comparing Equations (5), (6), (1), and (2), we note that the reservation price with complimentary
return-freight insurance is greater than the reservation price under MBG.
With a price p , the expected profits for the two types of online retailer are ( p − ch − Th ) − fh p and
( p − Tl ) − fl p , respectively. Substituting for p the appropriate reservation price, we get the online
retailer’s maximum expected profit with complimentary return-freight insurance:

ΠCh = (1 − fh )vh − ch − fh (tb − Ch ) − Th (7) ΠCl = (1 − fl )vl − fl (tb − Cl ) − Tl (8)

3.1 Can Complimentary Return-freight Insurance Signal Product Quality?
In particular, can we have a separating equilibrium with the high-quality online retailer offering a
complimentary return-freight insurance and the low-quality online retailer not offering it? Suppose
such an equilibrium exists, and let ph and pl be the prices offered by the two types of online retailer
in the equilibrium. Observing a complimentary return-freight insurance, the consumer infers high
quality. Not observe complimentary return-freight insurance the consumer infers low quality. The
retailers could use the signal to adjust the consumer’s subjective estimation of high or low quality.
However, this does not change the objective probability of the product not working.
What are necessary conditions for such an equilibrium? Clearly, ph ≤ rhn and pl ≤ rln because any price
greater than reservation price yields no sales for that type of online retailer and is therefore dominated
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for both types of online retailer by the reservation price. In fact, we can go further and assert that
pl = rln because any price less than rln is dominated by rln for type l product. The other basic
condition is that neither type of online retailer should want to masquerade as the other type. That is,
the low-quality online retailer must not gain by charging ph and offering complimentary returnfreight insurance,

(1 − fl )vl − cl − fl tb ≥ (1 − fl ) ph − cl − Tl (9)
and the high-quality online retailer must not gain by not offering return-freight insurance,

(1 − fh ) ph − ch − Th ≥ (1 − fh )rl − ch − fhtb (10)
π
f
π
f
Equations (9) can be written as ph ≤ vl + l − l (tb − Cl ) , define pi = vl + l − l (tb − Cl ) (11)
1 − fl 1 − fl
1 − fl 1 − fl
πh
fh
π
f
Equations (10) yields ph ≥ vl +
−
(tb − Ch ) , so po = vl + h − h (tb − Ch ) (12).
1 − fh 1 − fh
1 − fh 1 − fh
Intuitively, the high-type product price ph cannot be greater than the consumer's reservation price, rhC .
Therefore, to verify the high-type product price upper bound, there are two cases to consider: pi ≤ rhC
and pi > rhC .

3.1.1 Case 1 pi ≤ rhC
Given fl < 1 , pi is well defined and we confirm that ph must then be pi . What remains to check is the
requirement that pi ≥ po .
This condition, as well as the defining condition pi ≤ rhC , can be written in terms of as π h and C h as:

(1 − fh )π h + ( fl − fh )Ch ≤ (1 − fh )(1 − fl )(vh − vl ) + ( fl − fh )tb + (1 − fh )e1 + fl (1 − fh )e2 (13)
( fl − fh )π h + ( fl − fh )Ch ≥ ( fl − fh )tb + (1 − fh )e1 + fl (1 − fh )e2 (14)
The condition pi ≤ rhC is equivalent to equations (13) and the condition pi ≥ po is equivalent to
equations (14). Hence, the foregoing analysis can be summarized as saying that if π h and C h fulfil the
inequalities equations (13) and (14), then any separating equilibrium with only the high-quality seller
offering complimentary return-freight insurance must have ph = pi , pl = rln .

3.1.2 Case 2 pi > rhC
Since pi satisfies equations (9) as an equality, rhC must satisfy it strictly, which means when the lowtype retailer uses rhC as the product price and gives complementary return-freight insurance to
consumers. The retailer's profit is lower than only providing MBG. The high-type retailer uses rhC as
the price and makes the highest profit. Where po satisfies inequality equations (10), rhC must also.
The condition pi > rhC can be restated as

(1 − fh )π h + ( fl − fh )Ch > (1 − fh )(1 − fl )(vh − vl ) + ( fl − fh )tb + (1 − fh )e1 + fl (1 − fh )e2 (15)

There is an upper bound on π h , set by the nonnegative profit requirement, ΠCh ≥ 0 :

π h ≤ (1 − fh )vh − fhtb − ch (16)
The foregoing analysis tells us that when π h and C h fulfil the inequality equations (15) and (16), any
separating equilibrium with only the high-quality seller offering complimentary return-freight
insurance must have ph = rhC , pl = rln .
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Lemma 1. Under the condition that consumers’ perceived utility, vh , for high-type online products
when it works is be greater than or equal to

fh
fl
1
1
tb +
ch +
e1 +
e2 , the separating
1 − fh
1 − fh
fl − f h
fl − f h

equilibriums could exists.
Figure 2 combines Cases 1 and 2 that the upper bound equations (16) should be higher than the lower
limit equations (14) with C h ranging between 0 and tb .

3.2 The Role of Return-freight Insurance
πh

πh
Equilibrium
bounds

Equilibrium
bounds

Maximam
profit

Maximam
profit

0

tb

Ch

Insurance
constraints

0

tb

Ch

Figure 2: Separating equilibrium without return-freight insurance constraints (left)
Figure 3: Separating equilibrium with return-freight insurance constraints (right)
In our research, return-freight insurance is the signal cost and contains two parts, the premium and
the compensation. Based on the fact that different return-freight insurance offerings have different
profit and compensation levels, we get different separating equilibria. Therefore, the offer could signal
product quality signal or it could just add noise. As we mentioned, return-freight insurance has two
endogenous constraints: The insurance premium must be less than the compensation (T j < C j ) . Also
the insurance compensation must be less than or equal to the return-freight fee (C j ≤ tb ) to avoid the
insurance moral hazard. Based on T j = f j C j + π j , the constraint Th < C h can be translated into

π h < (1 − fh )Ch (17).
fh
fl
1
1
tb +
ch +
e1 +
e2 , the probability fh
1 − fh
1 − fh
fl − f h
fl − f h
e + fl e2
of the high-type online product not working should be less than or equal to fl − 1
.
t
Proposition 1. Under the condition vh ≥

Given constraint equation (17) and the lower limit equation (14), the slope of the insurance constraint,

1 − fh , should be greater than

e + fl e2
(1 − fh )e1 + fl (1 − fh )e2
. Solving the inequality, we get fh < fl − 1
.
t
tb

Once the reservation value is high enough and the possibility of product return is low enough, the
online retailer could use the strategy of offering complimentary return-freight insurance.
Proposition 2. When complimentary return-freight insurance does signal, the insurance
compensation,
,
should
be
greater
than
or
equal
to
Ch

1 − fh
fl (1 − fh )
1
tb +
e1 +
e2 .
2 − fh
( fl − fh )(2 − fh )
( fl − fh )(2 − fh )
Interestingly, in the separating equilibrium when the compensation C h increases, the range of the
insurance profit, π h , increases, while the insurance profit π h increases, but the range of the
compensation, C h , increases at first and then decreases. This effect is shown in Figure 3. This
happens for two reasons. The intuitive reason is that insurance profit cannot drive the cost of
insurance too high. Additionally, the compensation should not be high enough to create a moral
hazard.
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fh
fl
1
1
tb +
ch +
e1 +
e2 , the complimentary
1 − fh
1 − fh
fl − f h
fl − f h
return-freight insurance strategy only works when e1 + fl e2 < ( fl − fh )tb .
Proposition 3. Under the condition vh ≥

Corollary

1.

Under

the

conditions

of

Prop.3,

when

e1 + fl e2 < ( fl − fh )(vh − vl ) and

e1 + fl e2 < (1 − fh )tb − (1 − fl )(vh − vl ) , h-type retailer use complimentary insurance to maximize profit.

4 Conclusion and Future Research
We show the conditions when high-quality online retailers can use complimentary return-freight
insurance to effectively inform consumers about product quality. Due to page limitations, only
homogeneous consumers was considered. However, heterogeneous consumers could be reviewed in
future research. In the model we considered, once the quality information is unavailable,
complimentary return-freight insurance is a workable signal. Our results show that the efficacy of
complimentary return-freight insurance as a signal depends on the insurance company’s profit from
paying compensation if the consumers request it. These costs reduce the incentives for low-type
retailers to mimic the high-type online retailer’s strategy.
Moorthy and Srinivasan indicated that the seller should absorb the buyer's transaction costs when they
are small. While we show only when compensation is high can return-freight insurance work as signal.
We only consider the separating equilibrium in which high quality online retailers can both convey
their private information and maximize their profit. There is another equilibrium high-quality online
retailers could use to spread news that they have high-quality products to gain market share without
gain profit in the short term. Due to the page limited, we have not discussed this equilibrium.
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